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We study the terms of credit in a competitive market in which
sellers are willing to repeatedly ￿nance the purchases of buyers by
extending direct credit. Lenders (sellers) can commit to deliver any
long-term credit contract that does not result in a payo⁄ that is lower
than that associated with autarky, while borrowers (buyers) cannot
commit to any contract. A borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan is pri-
vately observable. As a result, the terms of credit within an enduring
relationship change over time, according to the history of trades. Two
borrowers are treated di⁄erently by the lenders with whom they are
paired because they have had distinct repayment histories. Although
there is free entry of lenders in the credit market, each lender has to
pay a cost to contact a borrower. A lower cost makes each borrower
better o⁄ from the perspective of the contracting date, results in less
variability in a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility, and makes each
lender uniformly worse o⁄ex post. As this cost becomes small, borrow-
ers get nearly the same terms of credit within their credit relationships
with lenders, regardless of individual repayment histories.
Keywords: Bilateral Credit, Unsecured Loans, Dynamic Contract-
ing, Initial Cost of Lending. JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D8, E4,
G2.
11 Introduction
The cost of starting a credit relationship has fallen signi￿cantly over the last
few decades. For instance, Mester (1997) points out that the use of credit
scoring has signi￿cantly reduced the time and cost in the loan approval
process. Barron and Staten (2003) and Berger (2003) also provide evidence
suggesting that advances in information technology have reduced the cost
of processing information for lenders. An important question that needs to
be addressed is the following: What is the impact of changes in the cost
of starting a credit relationship on the supply of credit? Drozd and Nosal
(2008) argue that such a drop in the initial cost of lending can account
for several stylized facts in the market for unsecured loans, such as the
signi￿cant increase in revolving lines of credit over the last two decades.
To derive these results, they introduce a search friction into an incomplete
markets model in which the terms of the contract o⁄ered by a lender are
￿xed. In a recent paper, Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2009) also use an
incomplete markets model to analyze the e⁄ect of technological progress on
consumer credit.
Although both models are successful in reproducing some stylized facts
of the market for unsecured loans, it is crucial to adopt a more fundamental
approach by not restricting the space of contracts that can be o⁄ered by a
lender in a competitive credit market. In this way, we can clearly analyze
how changes in the initial cost of lending a⁄ect the endogenous credit con-
tract o⁄ered by lenders. This is an essential aspect of the analysis because
the dynamics of long-term credit arrangements is an important property of
any model of credit. For instance, we observe in the real world that the
terms of credit o⁄ered by lenders in the market for unsecured loans change
over time and usually depend on a consumer￿ s history of repayments within
the credit relationship; see Bertaut and Haliassos (2006). In this paper,
we emphasize precisely how changes in the initial cost of lending a⁄ect the
dynamics of a bilateral credit relationship.
We study the impact of changes in the cost of starting a credit relation-
ship on the terms of the contract in a decentralized credit market in which a
seller is willing to repeatedly ￿nance the purchases of a buyer by extending
direct credit. Our approach is consistent with the endogenously incomplete
markets literature (see Sleet (2008)) where trading arrangements are derived
from primitive frictions instead of assumed. The frictions we choose to model
are the following. First, lenders are asymmetrically informed with respect
to a borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan. Second, lenders can commit to some
credit contracts while borrowers cannot commit to any contract. Speci￿-
2cally, lenders can commit to deliver any contract that does not result in a
payo⁄at any moment that is lower than that associated with autarky, while
borrowers have no ability to commit to long-term contracts. Third, trans-
actions within each credit relationship are not publicly observable, which
captures the idea that information is dispersed in the market for unsecured
loans. Fourth, it is costly for a lender to contact a borrower in the credit
market, as in Drozd and Nosal (2008) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
(2009), and it is also costly for a lender to walk away from a contract with a
borrower, as in Phelan (1995). Given these frictions, we derive the terms of
the contract that lenders o⁄er to borrowers in a competitive credit market.
We build on the model of perfect competition by Phelan (1995) in which
a lender and a borrower engage in a dynamic credit relationship. In his
model, there is a particular mechanism for price formation in the credit
market: lenders post the terms of the contract. One important di⁄erence is
that we assume that lenders need to pay a one-shot cost to make contact
with a borrower in the credit market. This captures the idea that it is costly
for a lender to start a credit relationship. Another crucial di⁄erence in our
model is that we make the ￿ ow of payments associated with a credit contract
explicit within each period, as opposed to net transfers. One important
characteristic of a credit transaction is that settlement takes place at a
future date: each credit transaction between a buyer and a seller necessarily
creates a liability to the buyer that needs to be settled some time in the
future. Given that buyers (borrowers) cannot commit to repay their loans,
we obtain a series of ex post individual rationality constraints. Making the
￿ ow of payments explicit allows us to clearly characterize how the loan and
repayment amounts within an enduring credit relationship evolve over time.
First, we characterize a lender￿ s optimal contract in the market for unse-
cured loans. Because a lender does not observe a borrower￿ s ability to repay
a loan, the terms of credit associated with a lender￿ s contract change over
time, according to the history of transactions within the enduring credit
relationship. In particular, a lender￿ s optimal contract has the property of
revolving credit, which is a contingency that allows a borrower to delay a
payment to his lender. This is a mechanism through which the lender ob-
tains more favorable terms of credit for future transactions within the credit
relationship. This means that whenever a borrower delays the repayment of
a loan, his lender extracts more surplus from the credit relationship by o⁄er-
ing less favorable terms for the borrower in future transactions: smaller loan
amounts and/or bigger state-contingent repayment amounts. In the model
proposed in this paper, borrowers are treated di⁄erently by the lenders with
whom they are paired because they have had distinct repayment histories.
3At any point in time, two borrowers face di⁄erent terms of credit to ￿-
nance their purchases because they have made distinct repayments to their
respective lenders in their past transactions.
After characterizing a lender￿ s optimal contract, we perform the com-
parative statics exercise of changing the cost that each lender has to pay to
contact a borrower in the credit market. A lower cost of starting a credit
relationship has the following impact on the equilibrium outcome: (i) each
borrower is better o⁄ from the perspective of the contracting date; (ii) a
borrower￿ s expected discounted utility ￿ uctuates within a smaller set; and
(iii) each lender is uniformly worse o⁄ ex post. A lower cost of entry in
the credit market leads to more competition among lenders, which in turn
results in more favorable terms of credit for each borrower. Another impli-
cation is that the terms of the contract are such that a borrower￿ s expected
discounted utility has less variability over time. The loan and repayment
amounts associated with a lender￿ s contract are such that the space of ex-
pected discounted utilities for a borrower shrinks as the initial cost of lending
falls. Finally, a lender￿ s cost function under an entry cost of k0 < k is uni-
formly above a lender￿ s cost function under the cost k, which necessarily
means that lenders are uniformly worse o⁄ ex post ￿after the decision of
entering the credit market.
One important result is that the history of transactions within each credit
relationship becomes less relevant to determine the terms of credit for future
transactions as the initial cost of lending approaches zero. As this cost falls,
the set of expected discounted utilities for a borrower shrinks, which means
that the terms of credit associated with a lender￿ s contract become very
similar across the population of borrowers regardless of individual repayment
histories. Finally, we show that a stationary equilibrium in the credit market
may not exist if both the initial cost of lending and the cost of walking away
from a credit contract are too small. In this case, there exists a lower bound
on the initial cost of lending for which we can guarantee that a stationary
equilibrium exists.
The model in this paper relates to decentralized models of credit, such as
Diamond (1990), Temzelides and Williamson (2001), Nosal and Rocheteau
(2006), Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2008), and Andolfatto (2008), as
opposed to centralized models of credit, such as Kehoe and Levine (1993)
and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). The model also builds on search-theoretic
models of money, such as Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005). How-
ever, we depart from these models by weakening the assumption that agents
cannot engage in enduring relationships. Finally, the analysis builds on dy-
namic contracting. Important papers in this literature include Green (1987),
4Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995), Kocherlakota
(1996), Aiyagari and Williamson (1999), and Krueger and Uhlig (2006).
2 The Model
Time is discrete and continues forever, and each period has two subperiods.
There are two types of agents, referred to as borrowers and lenders. In the
￿rst subperiod, a lender is able to produce the unique perishable consump-
tion good but does not want to consume, and a borrower wants to consume
but cannot produce. In the second subperiod, we have the opposite situa-
tion: a borrower is able to produce but does not want to consume, and a
lender wants to consume but cannot produce. Production and consumption
take place within each subperiod. This generates a double coincidence of
wants and, for this reason, we refer to the ￿rst subperiod as the transac-
tion stage and to the second subperiod as the settlement stage. The types
(borrower and lender) refer to the agent￿ s role in the transaction stage. The
production technology allows each agent to produce one unit of the good
with one unit of labor. Each agent receives an endowment of h > 0 units of
time in each subperiod.
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settlement stage. A borrower￿ s momentary utility from consuming qb
t units






that u : R+ ! D ￿ R is increasing, strictly concave, and continuously
di⁄erentiable. Let H denote the inverse of u, and let wa ￿ u(0) denote
the value associated with autarky. Producing yb
t units of the good in the
settlement stage generates disutility yb
t for a borrower. However, there is a
friction that a⁄ects a borrower￿ s ability to produce goods in the settlement
stage. With probability ￿ a borrower is unable to produce the consumption
good and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ a borrower can produce the good using
the linear production technology. This productivity shock is independently
and identically distributed over time. Each borrower learns his productivity
shock at the beginning of the settlement stage, which is privately observed.
Finally, let ￿ 2 (0;1) be the common discount factor over periods.
Suppose that there is a large number of borrowers and lenders, with the
set of lenders su¢ ciently large. There is a one-shot cost k > 0 in terms of
the consumption good for a lender to post a credit contract in the credit
market, which speci￿es consumption and production by each party as a
function of the available information. As in Drozd and Nosal (2008) and
5Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2009), we motivate this assumption as the
cost of contacting a borrower in the credit market and starting a credit
relationship. We assume that each lender can have at most one borrower; it
is in￿nitely costly for a lender to contact two borrowers at the same time.
Each lender also has to pay a cost ￿ > 0 to walk away from her current
contract. As in Phelan (1995), we motivate this assumption as a legal cost
that a lender has to pay to e⁄ectively walk away from her current contract
with a borrower.
Only the agents in a bilateral meeting observe the history of trades.
Other agents in the economy observe a break in a particular match but do
not observe the history of trades in that match. Notice that there are gains
from trade since a lender can produce the consumption good for a borrower
in the ￿rst subperiod (transaction stage) and a borrower can produce the
good for a lender in the second subperiod (settlement stage). An impor-
tant feature of the model is that, with probability ￿, a borrower is unable
to produce the good in the second subperiod and settle his debt. This is
equivalent to assuming that the settlement process involves a friction.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we study an equilibrium allocation under a particular pricing
mechanism: price posting by lenders. To enter the credit market, a lender
needs to post a contract to attract a borrower and start a credit relationship.
Although it is costly for a lender to make contact with a borrower, there is
free entry of lenders in the credit market. We characterize the terms of the
contract in each credit relationship in the economy and restrict attention
to a symmetric, stationary equilibrium in which each borrower receives a
market-determined credit contract o⁄ered by a lender that promises him
expected discounted utility w￿, from the perspective of the contracting date.
Each lender needs to provide incentives to induce the desired behavior by a
borrower given that a borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan is not observable.
We assume that lenders can commit to some credit contracts, while
borrowers cannot commit to any contract. Speci￿cally, each lender can
commit to deliver any contract that does not result at any moment in an
expected discounted utility that is lower than that associated with autarky;
recall that a lender always has the option of remaining inactive. On the other
hand, borrowers cannot commit to any contract and can walk away from a
credit relationship at any moment without any pecuniary punishment. As
we will see, a lender￿ s optimal contract results in a long-term relationship
6from which neither party wants to deviate.
The expected discounted utility w￿ associated with the market contract
must be such that it makes each lender indi⁄erent between entering the
credit market by posting a contract and remaining inactive, from the per-
spective of the contracting date. As a result, some lenders post a contract
and successfully match with a borrower, while others do not post a contract
and remain inactive. When o⁄ering her own contract, each lender takes as
given the contracts o⁄ered by the other lenders. The only relevant charac-
teristic about these contracts is the expected discounted utility w￿ that each
borrower associates with them. This is the utility that a borrower obtains
by accepting a lender￿ s contract, from the perspective of the signing date.
The equilibrium is symmetric because every active lender o⁄ers the same
credit contract.
The market contract must always result in an expected discounted utility
for a borrower that is greater than or equal to w￿. If the market contract
promises, in a given period, an expected discounted utility w0 for a borrower
which is less than w￿, the latter can do better by reneging on his current
contract and starting a new credit relationship with another lender. Recall
that inactive lenders observe the dissolution of a credit relationship and
may be willing to enter the credit market. Given that there is free entry
of lenders and limited commitment, we can have an equilibrium only if the
lowest promised expected discounted utility at any moment is exactly w￿.
3.1 Recursive Formulation of the Contracting Problem
A contract speci￿es in every period a transfer of the good from the lender
to the borrower in the transaction stage and a repayment ￿a transfer of
the good from the borrower to the lender ￿in the settlement stage as a
function of the available history of reports by the borrower. These are






t denote a partial history of reports,
where ￿￿ = 0 means that a borrower is unable to produce the good in the
settlement stage of period ￿ and ￿￿ = 1 means that he is able to produce it
in the settlement stage of period ￿.
In equilibrium, each active lender chooses to o⁄er a long-term contract,
which means that she matches with a borrower at the ￿rst date and keeps
him in the credit relationship forever. The long-term contract speci￿es quan-
tities produced and transferred within each subperiod. We say that in each
period t there is a transaction between a borrower and a lender that con-
sists of a loan amount from the lender to the borrower in the ￿rst subperiod
7(transaction stage) and a repayment amount in the second subperiod (set-
tlement stage) contingent on the report of the productive state of nature
(￿t = 1).
The optimal contracting problem has a recursive formulation in which
we can use a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility w 2 D as the state
variable. The optimal contract minimizes the expected discounted cost for
a lender of providing expected discounted utility w to a borrower subject
to incentive compatibility. Let C(w￿; ￿ w) : [w￿; ￿ w] ! R denote the expected
discounted cost for a lender that satis￿es the following functional equation:
C(w￿; ￿ w) (w) = min
’2￿(w￿; ￿ w)(w)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)[H (u) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)y1]+
￿
￿





Here, the choices are given by ’ = (u;y1;w0;w1), where u denotes a bor-
rower￿ s momentary utility of consumption in the transaction stage, y1 de-
notes his production in the settlement stage given that he is able to produce
the good, and w￿ denotes his promised expected discounted utility at the
beginning of the following period given that his report in the current period
is ￿ 2 f0;1g. Recall that ￿ = 0 means that a borrower is unable to produce
the good in the settlement stage and ￿ = 1 means that he is able to produce
it. The constraint set ￿(w￿; ￿ w) (w) consists of all ’ in D ￿ [0;h] ￿ [w￿; ￿ w]
2
satisfying a borrower￿ s individual rationality constraints,
w0 ￿ w￿, (2)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 ￿ ￿w￿, (3)
a borrower￿ s truth-telling constraint,
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 ￿ ￿w0, (4)
and the promise-keeping constraint,
(1 ￿ ￿)[u ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)y1] + ￿ [￿w0 + (1 ￿ ￿)w1] = w. (5)
It can be shown that, for any ￿xed lower bound w￿ and upper bound
￿ w, there exists a unique continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, and
strictly convex function C(w￿; ￿ w) : [w￿; ￿ w] ! R satisfying the functional equa-
tion (1). Let ^ u : [w￿; ￿ w] ! D, y : [w￿; ￿ w] ! [0;h], and g : [w￿; ￿ w] ￿ f0;1g !
[w￿; ￿ w] denote the associated policy functions, which can be shown to be
continuous and bounded.
8Given our transformation of the state space, a borrower￿ s expected dis-
counted utility w now summarizes his partial history of reports. As men-
tioned before, we say that there is a transaction between a lender and a
borrower in the current period whose terms are given by fH [^ u(w)];y (w)g.
The quantity H [^ u(w)] gives the loan amount from the lender to the bor-
rower in the transaction stage, and the quantity y (w) gives the repayment
amount in the settlement stage contingent on the report of the productive
state of nature. Both quantities depend on w. This means that the terms
of credit change over time according to the history of transactions, which is
summarized by the statistic w.
Notice that a lender cannot commit to a contract that gives her at any
moment an expected discounted utility that is lower than that associated
with autarky. As a result, individual rationality for a lender requires that
C(w￿; ￿ w) (w) ￿ ￿ holds for all w 2 [w￿; ￿ w]. Recall that a lender needs to
pay a cost ￿ > 0 in order to break up a credit relationship. As in Phelan
(1995), we motivate this assumption as a legal cost that a lender has to pay
to e⁄ectively walk away from her current contract with a borrower.
We show next that, for some values for the lower bound w￿, there exists
an upper bound ￿ w = ￿ w(w￿;￿) on the set of expected discounted utilities that
gives the highest promised expected utility to which a lender can commit
to deliver given that the lowest expected utility that can be promised is
w￿. As we will see later, the market utility w￿ is determined endogenously
and is such that it makes each lender indi⁄erent between entering the credit
market by posting a contract and remaining inactive. Before we proceed, it
is useful to de￿ne the following set: for any given value for ￿, let I (￿) = ￿
w : w ￿ wa and C(w;w) (w) ￿ ￿
￿
. Notice that for any w ￿ wa we have
C(w;w) (w) = H (w) ￿ 0. This is the expected discounted cost for a lender
of delivering expected discounted utility w to a borrower given that the
lender is constrained to choose the same continuation values regardless of
the state reported by the borrower. In this case, it is not possible to obtain
a repayment from the borrower: the only incentive-feasible value for y1 is
zero. Because H (w) is strictly increasing, we have that I (￿) is an interval
that shrinks as ￿ ! 0.
Lemma 1 For any w￿ 2 I (￿), there exists an upper bound ￿ w(w￿;￿) on the
set of expected discounted utilities such that C(w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)) [ ￿ w(w￿;￿)] = ￿.
Proof. Let ￿ wF (￿) denote the expected discounted utility for a borrower
such that the expected discounted cost for a lender of providing ￿ wF (￿)
given complete information equals ￿. De￿ne the function ￿ : [w￿; ￿ wF (￿)] !
9[w￿; ￿ wF (￿)] as follows. For any given w 2 [w￿; ￿ wF (￿)], if there is no w0 2
[w￿;w] such that C(w￿;w) (w0) = ￿, then ￿ (w) = w￿. Otherwise, ￿ (w)
equals the highest point w0 in [w￿;w] for which C(w￿;w) (w0) = ￿. Notice
that C(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿ by assumption, which implies that ￿ (w￿) = w￿. For




k=0 of candidates for the upper bound ￿ w in




with strict inequality if the truth-telling constraint (4) binds. Also, no-
tice that ￿(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿(w￿;w0) (w￿), which implies that C(w￿;w0) (w￿) ￿
C(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿. The ￿rst inequality is strict if the truth-telling con-







= ￿. This means that w1 = ￿
￿
w0￿
￿ w0. We proceed in







= ￿. Given that ￿(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿
￿(w￿;w1) (w￿), we have that C(w￿;w1) (w￿) ￿ C(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿. Again, con-







This means that w2 = ￿
￿
w1￿
￿ w1. Notice then that
￿
wk￿1
k=0 is a non-
increasing sequence on a closed interval. As a result, it converges to a point
w1 in the interval [w￿; ￿ wF (￿)]. The Theorem of the Maximum guarantees
that ￿(w) ￿ C(w￿;w) (w) moves continuously, which implies that w1 is the
highest ￿xed point of ￿. Q.E.D.
To ease notation, de￿ne Cw￿ (w) ￿ C(w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)) (w) and de￿ne the set
Dw￿ ￿ [w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)]. Given that Cw￿ (w) is strictly increasing in w, it
follows that Cw￿ (w) ￿ ￿ for all w in the set Dw￿. This means that, for any
given lower bound w￿, Dw￿ gives the set of promised expected discounted
utilities that are actually incentive-feasible. If the truth-telling constraint
binds, then it follows that ￿ w(w￿;￿) > w￿ for any lower bound w￿ satisfying
C(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿. We show next that the truth-telling constraint indeed
binds for any w in Dw￿. But ￿rst notice that the truth-telling constraint (4),
together with the constraint 0 ￿ y (w) ￿ h, implies that g (w;1) ￿ g (w;0)
for all w 2 Dw￿, which means that the optimal contract needs to assign a
higher promised expected discounted utility to a borrower contingent on the
realization of the productive state of nature to e⁄ectively induce truthful
reporting.
Lemma 2 The truth-telling constraint (4) binds for any w 2 Dw￿.
Proof. Suppose that
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 > ￿w0 (6)
10holds at the optimum. This implies that
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 > ￿w￿ (7)
must also hold at the optimum. Now, reduce the left-hand side of (6) and (7)
by a small amount ￿ > 0 so that both inequalities continue to hold. De￿ne
w0
1 = w1 ￿ ￿￿ and w0
0 = w0 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿. Notice that ￿w0
0 + (1 ￿ ￿)w0
1 =
￿w0+(1 ￿ ￿)w1 and w0
1￿w0












< ￿Cw￿ (w0) + (1 ￿ ￿)Cw￿ (w1),
so that the value of the objective function on the right-hand side of (1) falls.
Since all constraints continue to be satis￿ed, this implies a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
An immediate consequence of the previous result is that w￿ < ￿ w(w￿;￿)
for any given w￿ 2 I (￿), that is, any w￿ ￿ wa such that C(w￿;w￿) (w￿) ￿ ￿.
3.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium
Now, we need to ensure that there exists a market-determined expected
discounted utility w￿ associated with a market contract that makes each
lender indi⁄erent between posting a contract and remaining inactive. This
is equivalent to showing the existence of an equilibrium.
Formally, a stationary and symmetric equilibrium consists of a cost func-
tion Cw : Dw ! R, policy functions ^ u : Dw ! D, y : Dw ! [0;h],
g : Dw ￿ f0;1g ! Dw, and a market utility w￿ such that: (i) Cw￿ sat-
is￿es (1); (ii) (^ u;y;g) are the optimal policy functions associated with (1);
and (iii) w￿ satis￿es the free-entry condition:
Cw￿ (w￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0. (8)
The market utility w￿ gives the expected discounted utility for a borrower at
the signing date. Due to limited commitment and free entry of lenders in the
credit market, it is also the lower bound on the set of expected discounted
utilities.
Lemma 3 Given ￿ > 0, there exist k
ﬂ
(￿) and ￿ k(￿), with 0 ￿ k
ﬂ
(￿) < ￿ k(￿),
such that there exists a unique expected discounted utility w￿ satisfying (8)







11Proof. Notice that Cwa (wa) < 0. We need k > 0 to be such that Cwa (wa)+
(1 ￿ ￿)k < 0 and Cw￿ (w￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ 0, where w￿ = supI (￿). If
Cw￿ (w￿) ￿ 0, then the lower bound k
ﬂ
(￿) equals 0 and the upper bound
￿ k(￿) is given by the value of k satisfying Cwa (wa) + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0. If
Cw￿ (w￿) < 0, then the lower bound k
ﬂ
(￿) is given by the value of k satisfying
Cw￿ (w￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0 and the upper bound is given by the value of k
satisfying Cwa (wa)+(1 ￿ ￿)k = 0. Given that ^ ￿(w) ￿ Cw (w) is continuous








To show uniqueness, de￿ne the mapping ￿ : [wa;w￿] ! [wa;w￿] as
follows. If Cw+(1 ￿ ￿)k is always greater than zero on [w;w￿], then ￿ (w) =
wa. Otherwise, ￿ (w) equals the point w0 2 [w;w￿] for which Cw (w0) +
(1 ￿ ￿)k = 0. We claim that ￿ is non-increasing in w. To verify this
claim, we need to show ￿rst that ￿ w(w;￿) is non-increasing in w. Fix a
lower bound w0 in the set [wa;w￿], and consider the associated upper bound
￿ w(w0;￿). Take another point w00 > w0 in the set [wa; ￿ w(w0;￿)]. Notice that
C(w0; ￿ w(w0;￿)) ￿ C(w00; ￿ w(w0;￿)). Thus, we have that C(w00; ￿ w(w0;￿)) [ ￿ w(w0;￿)] ￿ ￿
given that C(w0; ￿ w(w0;￿)) [ ￿ w(w0;￿)] = ￿ by the de￿nition of ￿ w(w0;￿). This
implies that ￿ w(w00;￿) ￿ ￿ w(w0;￿), and we conclude that ￿ w(w;￿) is indeed
non-increasing in w. The fact that ￿ w(w;￿) is non-increasing then implies
that raising the lower bound w only tightens the constraint set ￿(w; ￿ w(w;￿)) (￿).
As a result, the point at which Cw+(1 ￿ ￿)k equals zero is a non-increasing
function of the lower bound w, which means that ￿ can have at most one
￿xed point. Q.E.D.
Notice that ex ante each lender gets zero expected discounted utility
by posting a contract. Ex post a lender gets a higher utility, given that
Cw￿ (w￿) < 0. Moreover, as the contract is executed, there is no history
of reports by a borrower that gives a lender an expected discounted utility
that is lower than that associated with autarky. For this reason, neither a
lender nor a borrower ￿nds it optimal to renege on the credit contract.
If ￿ is su¢ ciently small, then it is possible to have k
ﬂ
(￿) > 0. This means
that a stationary equilibrium may not exist if the initial cost of lending k
is too small. To verify this claim, we ￿rst need to show that ￿ w(w;￿) is
non-increasing in ￿. Notice that ￿ wF (￿0) < ￿ wF (￿) for any 0 < ￿0 < ￿.
Also, notice that I (￿0) ￿ I (￿). If we ￿x w￿ 2 I (￿0) and construct the
candidate sequences for the upper bound on the set of expected discounted
utilities in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 1, we will ￿nd that
￿ w(w￿;￿) ￿ ￿ w(w￿;￿), which means that ￿ w(w;￿) is indeed non-increasing
in ￿. Second, notice that we must have Cwa (wa) < 0 for any given ￿ > 0.
12This means that, for a su¢ ciently small value for ￿, we have Cw￿ (w￿) < 0,
in which case k
ﬂ
(￿) > 0.
It is important to keep in mind the possibility that a stationary equi-
librium may not exist when both the cost of walking away from a credit
contract ￿ and the initial cost of lending k are small. In a later section, we
will conduct the comparative statics exercise of changing the initial cost of
lending k holding ￿ ￿xed. However, there may not exist a stationary equi-
librium if we reduce the initial cost of lending too much when ￿ is small.
3.3 Properties of the Optimal Contract
In this subsection, we characterize the policy functions ^ u(w), y (w), g (w;￿)
and establish some important properties of the optimal contract. We can
rewrite the optimization problem on the right-hand side of (1) in the follow-
ing way. The relevant constraints for the optimization problem are (2),
￿(1 ￿ ￿)y1 + ￿w1 = ￿w0, (9)
and
(1 ￿ ￿)(u ￿ y1) + ￿w1 = w. (10)
Substituting (9) and (10) into (1), the optimization problem now consists of




















(1 ￿ ￿)Cw￿ (w1)
)
,




y1 ￿ w￿. (11)
The ￿rst-order conditions for the optimal choice of y1 are
H0
￿





w￿ [g (w;0)] +
￿(w)
￿
￿ 1 ￿ ￿, (12)
if y (w) < h, and
H0
￿





w￿ [g (w;0)] +
￿(w)
￿
￿ 1 ￿ ￿, (13)
13if y (w) > 0. The ￿rst-order condition for the optimal choice of w1 is
H0
￿




















y (w) ￿ w￿
￿
= 0, (15)
where ￿(w) ￿ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (11).
Finally, the envelope condition is given by
C0
w￿ (w) = H0
￿





for any value of w in the interior of the set Dw￿.
Now, we establish some properties of the optimal continuation value
g (w;￿) for each ￿ 2 f0;1g. These give a borrower￿ s expected discounted
utility at the beginning of the following period associated with the market
contract as a function of his initially promised expected discounted utility
w and his report in the settlement stage of the current period. If a bor-
rower￿ s expected discounted utility falls in the subsequent period relative to
the current period, this means that the terms of the contract become less
favorable for him ￿and as a result more favorable for the lender with whom
he is paired.
Lemma 4 g (w;1) ￿ w for all w 2 Dw￿.
Proof. Suppose that g (w;1) < w for some w in the interior of Dw￿. Given
that g (w;1) < w ￿ ￿ w(w￿;￿), it must be that
C0
w￿ (w) = ￿C0
w￿ [g (w;0)] + (1 ￿ ￿)C0




Recall that g (w;1) ￿ g (w;0) and that Cw￿ (w) is strictly convex in w. As
a result, we have that
C0






where the last inequality follows because ￿(w) ￿ 0. But this results in a
contradiction. Hence, we conclude that g (w;1) ￿ w for all w in the interior
14of Dw￿. The fact that g (w;1) is continuous implies that g (w;1) ￿ w holds
for all w 2 Dw￿ as claimed. Q.E.D.
A repayment by a borrower in the settlement stage results in at least the
same terms of credit for future transactions within the credit relationship.
If a borrower reports the productive state of nature in the settlement stage
and as a result makes a repayment y (w) > 0 to his lender, his expected
discounted utility at the beginning of the following period g (w;1) either
rises or remains the same. This means that the terms of credit for all future
transactions within the relationship either become more favorable or remain
the same for him. This property of the optimal contract arises because a
lender cannot observe a borrower￿ s ability to repay a loan in the settlement
stage. As a result, a lender needs to induce a repayment from a borrower
who is currently productive in the settlement stage by promising him at
least the same terms of credit for future transactions as those promised for
the current transaction.
Lemma 5 The function g (w;0) has the following properties: (i) g (w;0) <
w for all w > w￿; (ii) g (w￿;0) = w￿; and (iii) there exists ￿ > 0 such that
g (w;0) = w￿ for all w 2 [w￿;w￿ + ￿).
Proof. First, notice that we must have y (w) > 0 for all w 2 Dw￿. To
verify this claim, suppose that y (w) = 0 for some w 2 (w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)).
Then, we must have g (w;1) = g (w;0) given that (4) holds with equality.
Moreover, either g (w;1) = g (w;0) = ￿ w(w￿;￿) or g (w;1) = g (w;0) <
￿ w(w￿;￿). If g (w;1) = g (w;0) = ￿ w(w￿;￿), then (14) and (16) imply that
C0
w￿ (w) ￿ C0
w￿ [ ￿ w(w￿;￿)], which results in a contradiction. Suppose now
that g (w;1) = g (w;0) < ￿ w(w￿;￿). From (14) and (16), we conclude that
g (w;1) = g (w;0) = w. Thus, we have that Cw￿ (w) = H (w) > H (wa) = 0,
which also implies a contradiction. Therefore, we must have y (w) > 0
for all w 2 (w￿; ￿ w(w￿;￿)). Continuity then implies that y (w￿) > 0 and
y [ ￿ w(w￿;￿)] > 0, so that y (w) > 0 for all w 2 Dw￿ as claimed. As a result,
g (w;1) > g (w;0) for all w 2 Dw￿.
Suppose that g (w;0) ￿ w for some w > w￿. From (14) and (16), we
have that
C0
w￿ (w) ￿ ￿C0
w￿ [g (w;0)] + (1 ￿ ￿)C0
w￿ [g (w;1)] > C0
w￿ (w),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that Cw￿ (w) is strictly convex
in w and the fact that g (w;1) > g (w;0). But we obtain a contradiction.
15Hence, we must have g (w;0) < w for all w > w￿. Since g (w;0) is continuous
in w, it follows that g (w￿;0) = w￿.
Finally, to prove (iii), suppose that g (w￿ + ";0) > w￿ for all " > 0.
Then, (14) and (16) require that
C0
w￿ (w￿ + ") ￿ ￿C0
w￿ [g (w￿ + ";0)] + (1 ￿ ￿)C0
w￿ [g (w￿ + ";1)]
holds for all " > 0, which in turn requires that lim"!0 g (w￿ + ";1) = w￿.
But this implies a contradiction. Q.E.D.
If the borrower delays a repayment to his lender in the settlement stage,
then the terms of the contract become less favorable for him in all future
transactions within the credit relationship. As a result of intertemporal allo-
cation of resources by a risk-neutral lender, a delayed repayment is compen-
sated by more favorable terms of credit for the lender in future transactions.
In fact, we can interpret the state in which the borrower does not make a
payment to the lender as the practice of revolving credit that we observe in
the market for unsecured loans.
The contracts that we actually observe in this market take the form
of a credit line. In the model, when the borrower truthfully reports the
unproductive state ￿and as a result delays his repayment to the lender ￿we
can say that such an action creates a liability for the borrower, which alters
the terms of credit for the following transaction within the relationship. The
fact that a lender o⁄ers a contract with this property is precisely because
such a mechanism allows the lender to extract the maximum surplus from
the borrower given the possible alternatives that the latter has. Hence, the
property of revolving credit that we observe in a lender￿ s optimal contract
is part of an optimal mechanism through which the lender obtains more
favorable terms of credit for future transactions within the relationship.
We want now to better characterize the loan amounts H [^ u(w)]. Notice
that the envelope condition (16) implies that the loan amount to which a bor-
rower is entitled in the transaction stage is strictly increasing in his promised
expected discounted utility w. As we have seen, the optimal provision of
incentives by a lender results in a lower promised expected discounted utility
for a borrower who reports the unproductive state and as a result fails to
make a repayment. Thus, the loan amount that a borrower receives from
a lender in the subsequent transaction stage shrinks, given that H [^ u(w)]
is a strictly increasing function. This shows how the loan amount that a
borrower receives from a lender in the current transaction depends on the
history of trades within the credit relationship.
16It is useful to de￿ne a statistic that summarizes the terms of credit within
each enduring relationship. Notice that the expected return to a lender on
the current transaction is given by
R(w) ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)y (w)
H [^ u(w)]
, (17)
which summarizes the terms of credit for the current transaction as a func-
tion of w. Since a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility w evolves over time
within the set Dw￿ according to the history of transactions within the credit
relationship, we expect R(w) to ￿ uctuate over time as a result.
Lemma 6 The statistic R(w) de￿ned by (17) is strictly decreasing in w.
Proof. It remains to be shown that y (w) is non-increasing on Dw￿. To
verify this claim, suppose that there is an interval ~ D ￿ Dw￿ on which
y (w) is strictly increasing. Then, there is an interval ^ D ￿ ~ D on which
0 < y (w) < h. Notice that (12)-(14) imply that g (w;1) is constant on
^ D. Then, (9) implies that g (w;0) must be strictly decreasing on ^ D. This
necessarily means that ￿(w) = 0 for all w 2 ^ D. As a result, we must have
C0
w￿ (w) = ￿C0
w￿ [g (w;0)] + 1 ￿ ￿
for all w 2 ^ D. But this implies a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that
y (w) is non-increasing on Dw￿ as claimed. Q.E.D.
The statistic R(w), which is depicted in Figure 1, captures the evolution
of the terms of credit according to the history of transactions (summarized
by w). This means that R(w￿) gives the worst terms of credit for a borrower,
while R[ ￿ w(w￿;￿)] gives the best terms of credit. A lower value for w in Dw￿
implies that R(w) is relatively higher ￿closer to the upper bound R(w￿).
This means that the terms of credit for the current transaction are less
favorable for the borrower ￿and more favorable for the lender ￿because
he has had a weak repayment history within the relationship. Worse terms
of credit for a borrower mean that he is entitled to a lower loan amount in
the transaction stage and/or is required to make a bigger repayment in the
settlement stage, contingent on the realization of the productive state.
Notice that the dynamics for R(w) depend critically on the assumption
that the productivity shock is privately observed by the borrower. It is
precisely because a lender is unable to observe a borrower￿ s ability to repay
his loan that we observe the spreading of a borrower￿ s continuation values
associated with a lender￿ s optimal contract.
174 Changes in the Initial Cost of Lending
An important parameter in the model is the cost k > 0 that a lender has
to pay in order to post a contract in the credit market. We have seen
that there exist k
ﬂ
(￿) and ￿ k(￿), with 0 ￿ k
ﬂ







, there exists a unique market utility w￿ (k;￿) such that
^ ￿[w￿ (k;￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)k = 0, where ^ ￿(w) ￿ Cw (w). Again, w￿ (k;￿) gives
a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility from the perspective of the signing
date. We are holding the cost of walking away from a contract ￿ ￿xed.
Given that ^ ￿(w) is a continuous function, for any k0 in a neighborhood of
k, there exists a unique w￿ (k0;￿) such that ^ ￿[w￿ (k0;￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)k0 = 0.
Moreover, if k0 > k, we have that w￿ (k0;￿) < w￿ (k;￿); if k0 < k, we have
that w￿ (k0;￿) > w￿ (k;￿). In the proof of Lemma 3, we have established
that the upper bound ￿ w(w￿;￿) on the set of expected discounted utilities
is a non-increasing function of the lower bound w￿. Thus, we have that
Dw￿(k;￿) ￿ Dw￿(k0;￿) if k0 > k and that Dw￿(k0;￿) ￿ Dw￿(k;￿) if k0 < k. This
means that a lower value for k results in a smaller set of expected discounted
utilities.
We have some important implications. First, a lower value for k makes
each borrower better o⁄ from the perspective of the signing date because
the expected discounted utility associated with the market contract rises: a
lower cost of entry results in more competition in the credit market. Second,
there is less variability in a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility over time.
The terms of the contract are such that a borrower￿ s expected discounted
utility ￿ uctuates within a smaller set according to the history of trades.
Third, a lender￿ s cost function under k0 < k is uniformly above her cost
function under k; see Figure 2. This means that a lower value for k makes
each lender uniformly worse o⁄ ex post.1
We can interpret k > 0 as the initial cost of lending per customer for
each lender in the market for unsecured loans. If technological progress
drives the cost to nearly zero, we should expect small ￿ uctuations over time
in a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility. As a result, the terms of credit
that borrowers receive ￿measured by R(w) ￿are nearly the same across the
population of borrowers, regardless of their particular repayment histories.
Another prediction of the model is that borrowers obtain more favorable
terms of credit at the signing date as the initial cost of lending approaches
zero.
1Ex post means after the decision of entering the credit market by posting a contract.
Recall that ex ante a lender is always indi⁄erent in equilibrium.
18If ￿ is very small, then a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility ￿ uctuates
over a very small set as k approaches the lower bound k
ﬂ
(￿). This means
that at any point in time the di⁄erence between the expected discounted
utility associated with the worst terms of credit, given by R(w￿), and the
expected discounted utility associated with the best terms of credit, given by
R[w(w￿;￿)], is very small across the population of borrowers. As a result,
a borrower￿ s repayment history does not much a⁄ect the terms of credit
that are o⁄ered to him within a credit relationship. However, a stationary
equilibrium may not exist when both k and ￿ are too small. In this case,
there is a strictly positive lower bound on the initial cost of lending for which
we can guarantee that a stationary equilibrium exists.
5 Discussion
A property of the equilibrium allocation is that at any moment borrowers
are di⁄erentiated by lenders exclusively, according to their history of trans-
actions ￿loan and repayment amounts ￿within a credit relationship. This
means that two borrowers are treated di⁄erently by the lenders with whom
they are paired only because they have had distinct repayment histories
(due to di⁄erent histories of productivity shocks). Recall that at the ￿rst
date each lender o⁄ers the same contract to a borrower. Borrowers are ex
ante identical and face variable terms of credit over time within their credit
relationships with lenders as a result of di⁄erent histories of productivity
shocks. This is di⁄erent from other theories of unsecured credit that assume
that borrowers are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to some characteris-
tic. For instance, in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2009), borrowers di⁄er
ex ante with respect to a characteristic that a⁄ects their ability to repay a
loan; in Chatterjee, Corbae, and R￿os-Rull (2008), households di⁄er ex ante
with respect to the likelihood of a loss in their wealth.
In Drozd and Nosal (2008), borrowers are ex ante identical and di⁄er
ex post with respect to their wealth and income. In their analysis, the
terms of the contract are ￿xed over time within each relationship between
a borrower and a lender. This is a su¢ cient condition for obtaining default
in equilibrium so that it is possible to interpret some results as bankruptcy.
The contribution of our paper is to perform the comparative statics exercise
of changing the initial cost of lending and to establish some properties of the
equilibrium allocation in an environment where no restriction on the space of
contracts is exogenously imposed. Although some properties that we obtain
are similar ￿ a lower initial cost of lending makes each borrower better
19o⁄ ￿others arise precisely because the form of the contract is completely
endogenous.
As we have seen, each borrower in the economy should get nearly the
same terms of credit within his credit relationship with a lender as a result
of any technological progress that drives the initial cost of lending to nearly
zero. The history of transactions within each credit relationship becomes
less relevant to determine the terms of credit for future transactions as the
initial cost of lending approaches zero.
6 Long-Run Properties
In this section, we study the long-run properties of the equilibrium alloca-
tion. Speci￿cally, we show that there exists a well-behaved long-run dis-
tribution of expected discounted utilities with mobility. Let ￿(Dw￿;D) be
the space of all probability measures   on the measurable space (Dw￿;D),


















w 2 Dw￿ : g (w;￿) 2 D0￿
.
Notice that a ￿xed point of the operator T￿ corresponds to an invariant
distribution over Dw￿.
Lemma 7 The operator T￿ has a unique ￿xed point  ￿, and for any proba-
bility measure   in ￿(Dw￿;D), T￿n  converges to  ￿ in the total variation
norm.
Proof. Let  w denote the probability measure that concentrates mass on
the point w. I will show that there exist N ￿ 1 and " > 0 such that ￿
T￿N w
￿
(w￿) ￿ " for all w 2 Dw￿. From Lemma 5, there exists k > 0 such
that either g (w;0) ￿ w ￿ k or g (w;0) = w￿ for all w 2 Dw￿. Now, choose
an integer N ￿ 1 large enough so that ￿ w(w￿;￿) ￿ kN ￿ w￿. Then, the
probability of moving from the point ￿ w(w￿;￿) to the point w￿ in N steps is
at least ￿N. Since g (w;0) is non-decreasing in w, such a transition to w￿ is
at least as probable from any other point in Dw￿. Thus, if " = ￿N, then the
20implied Markov process satis￿es the hypotheses of Theorem 11.12 of Stokey,
Lucas, and Prescott (1989), and the proof is complete. Q.E.D.
The existence of a non-degenerate long-run distribution derives from the
fact that there is no absorbing point, which implies that the entire state
space is an ergodic set. The role of limited commitment is to bound the set
of promised utilities, which is necessary to obtain a non-degenerate long-
run distribution. Speci￿cally, the lower bound w￿ on the set of expected
discounted utility entitlements arises due to the fact that a borrower can
defect from his current contract and sign with another lender at any moment.
The upper bound ￿ w(w￿;￿) is the highest expected discounted utility to
which a lender can commit to deliver to a borrower given that the lowest
expected discounted utility that can be promised is w￿.
7 Conclusion
We have characterized the terms of the contract that a lender o⁄ers to a
borrower in a competitive credit market with the following characteristics:
lenders are asymmetrically informed about a borrower￿ s ability to repay a
loan; lenders can commit to some credit contracts, while borrowers cannot
commit to any contract; the history of trades within each enduring credit
relationship in the economy is not publicly observable; and it is costly for
a lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract. These
frictions result in a market contract whose terms vary over time, according
to the history of trades within each long-term credit relationship. A lender￿ s
optimal contract has the property of revolving credit, which is a contingency
that allows a borrower to delay a repayment to his lender. This is a mech-
anism through which the lender obtains more favorable terms of credit for
future transactions within the credit relationship.
If technological progress drives the cost to nearly zero, we should expect
small ￿ uctuations over time in a borrower￿ s expected discounted utility. As
a result, the terms of credit associated with a lender￿ s contract become very
similar across the population of borrowers, regardless of individual repay-
ment histories. Another prediction of the model is that a borrower obtains
more favorable terms of credit as the initial cost of lending approaches zero:
a market contract is such that each borrower is better o⁄ from the per-
spective of the contracting date. Although we do not exploit the model￿ s
quantitative implications in this paper, we provide important properties of
a lender￿ s optimal contracting problem in the market for unsecured loans
with the characteristics described above.
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Figure 2 - Lender’s Cost Function
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